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The well-known question whether regional trade agreements (RTAs)
and the multilateral trading system (MTS) are ￿strangers, friends, or
foes￿ (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996) has gained new importance
with the widespread proliferation of RTAs in recent years. Based on
an extensive data set which covers most of world trade over the past
60 years and about 240 regional trade agreements, we analyze the rela-
tionship between RTAs and the MTS by combining the gravity model
framework with vector auto-regression analysis. Impulse-response-
functions robustly suggest that multilateral trade liberalization re-
sponds in a signi￿cantly positive way to regional trade liberalization.
We also ￿nd robust evidence that RTA liberalization Granger-causes
GATT/WTO liberalization. Thus, our results indicate that RTAs do
not undermine the MTS but serve as building blocs to multilateral
trade liberalization.
JEL: F13
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model.1 Motivation
While the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) grew only slowly un-
til the beginning of the 1990s, it has remarkably increased since then. In
December 2008, 230 RTAs were noti￿ed to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the WTO (2009c) expects close to 400 RTAs by 2010 (also
Fiorentino et al., 2008). Not only the geographic reach of today￿ s RTAs has
expanded, but also their agenda (Baldwin and Low, 2008). Besides mere tar-
i⁄ regulation, many RTAs now include provisions on services, investments,
competition rules, as well as a bunch of other issues. How does this wide
proliferation of regionalism relate to global trade liberalization? Following
Bhagwati (1991) RTAs could be either stumbling or building blocs to global
trade liberalization, i. e. RTAs could contribute to further multilateral liber-
alization by complementing GATT/WTO or they could impede multilateral
trade liberalization. Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) further re￿ned this
question and ask whether RTAs and the multilateral trading system (MTS)
are ￿strangers, friends, or foes￿ , adding the possibility that RTAs and the
MTS develop independently from each other.
Baldwin (2004) summarizes the logic and fears which are associated with
RTAs as stumbling blocs to global trade liberalization and identi￿es two key
risks of regionalism. Firstly, regional liberalization might be a substitute for
multilateral liberalization since it i) dampens nations￿intentness for further
multilateral liberalization and ii) diverts policy makers￿attention away from
WTO negotiations (e. g., Bhagwati, 1992). Secondly, regionalism might alter
the division of power so that i) small nations are even more dominated by
1hegemonic powers and ii) the possibility of tensions (and even trade wars)
between trade blocs increases (Panagariya, 1999). According to Baldwin
(2004), these fears are mainly based on the historical experience during the
interwar period.
Summers (1991) rejects this pessimistic view and points out that after
World War II regionalism contributed to tari⁄liberalization and that there is
no clear evidence that regionalism has undermined multilateralism. Bergsten
(1997) and Trejos (2005) emphasize that RTAs are not inherently protection-
ist, but instead can even help reduce political tensions between countries.
Additionally, RTAs can stimulate both internal and international political
dynamics by providing an experimental ground for new liberalization ideas
(also Pomfret, 2006). Moreover, RTAs can improve the stability and credibil-
ity of countries which should have positive e⁄ects on multilateral negotiations
(Paiva and Gazel, 2003).
In contrast to the extensive theoretical literature, empirical research has
so far been rather limited. For instance, Limao (2006, 2007) studies the
impact of US RTAs on the evolution of the US external multilateral tari⁄s
before and after the Uruguay round negotiations.1 In his regression analysis
Limao (2006, 2007) ￿nds that, the US liberalized external multilateral tari⁄s
on products mainly traded with non-RTA partners much more than external
multilateral tari⁄s on products traded primarily with regional trading part-
ners. The rationale of this policy could be that the US o⁄ers preferences to
1While Limao (2006) incorporates North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) and US-Israel in his analysis, Limao (2007) focuses only on
CBI and ATPA.
2receive concessions from the recipients. Since the concessions are all the more
valuable the larger the preference margin is, the US tries to prevent the ero-
sion of preferences by resisting multilateral liberalization. Thus, he concludes
that RTAs act as a stumbling bloc to US multilateral trade liberalization.
Other studies also use apply this concept focussing on di⁄erent countries and
regions, however. Karacaovali and Limao (2008) study how RTAs a⁄ect the
EU￿ s external multilateral tari⁄s, Estevadeordal et al. (2008) focus on the
impact of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean
Community (CAN) on the multilateral tari⁄ setting behavior of ten Latin-
American countries, and Magee and Lee (2001) examine how the formation
of the European Economic Community (EEC) a⁄ected external tari⁄s of its
members. With a di⁄erent concept, Foroutan (1998) carries out a descriptive
analysis on the external trading behavior of 50 developing countries over the
period 1965-1995. Using trade ￿ ows, import tari⁄s and trade liberalization
indicators, she examines whether there is a systematic relationship between
developing countries￿membership in a RTA and the external liberalization of
their trade. Her results reject such a systematic relationship. Summarizing,
the empirical literature ￿as well as the theoretical literature ￿is inconclusive
as RTAs are sometimes found to be stumbling blocs and in some cases to be
building blocs for multilateral trade liberalization.
From a methodological point of view, these approaches are limited in
several ways. The studies investigate selected countries and regions only,
thereby ignoring the interactions with other RTAs these countries or their
trading partners are members of. The studies cover rather limited time pe-
3riods which are generally too short to account for the political dynamics
between regionalism and multilateralism summarized by Baldwin (2004) and
emphasized by Bhagwati (1992) as well as Summers (1991). The time periods
are also too short to adequately account for the so-called ￿rst wave of region-
alism in the 1950s and more importantly the new developments in regionalism
since the 1990s and the 2000s (second and third wave of regionalism). The
studies focus only on the external tari⁄setting behavior of countries engaged
in regional arrangements thereby neglecting other dimensions of trade liber-
alization, such as non-tari⁄ barriers. Foroutan (1998) points out that other
indicators, such as actual trade ￿ ows and trade liberalization indicators, are
also important.
This study adds to the literature in several ways. We examine a sam-
ple of 184 countries with 240 RTAs so that we can control for interactions
between various regional arrangements and a country￿ s membership in more
than one RTA. Our data set covers the period from 1953-2006 which is long
enough to adequately account for the political dynamics between regionalism
and multilateralism, and to include the beginnings of regional arrangements
during the 1950s as well as more recent developments. Based on the building
bloc/stumbling bloc discussion, we investigate the relationship between mul-
tilateral and regional trade liberalization. The literature so far has associated
trade liberalization with the countries￿external tari⁄ setting behavior. We
follow Foroutan (1998) and measure trade liberalization by the actual impact
of regional and multilateral trade liberalization on trade ￿ ows so that we can
account for the whole range of trade liberalizing measures.
4To investigate the dynamic e⁄ects of RTAs and especially the possibly
causal interrelation between regional and multilateral trade liberalization,
we combine a gravity model framework with vector auto-regressive (VAR)
analysis. Using impulse-response-functions, our study shows that trade lib-
eralization on the multilateral level responds signi￿cantly positive to regional
trade liberalization. Additionally, we ￿nd that RTA liberalization Granger-
causes multilateral liberalization. By contrast, there is no robust evidence
for such an e⁄ect in the opposite direction. Thus, the results suggest that
regional trade liberalization does not undermine but rather contributes to
multilateral trade liberalization.
2 General Research Strategy
In our analysis, we proceed in three steps. First, we estimate the time-speci￿c
impact of both GATT/WTO and RTAs on international trade for each year
using an extensive gravity model and ￿xed e⁄ects Poisson maximum likeli-
hood (FE-PML) estimation to derive two time-series that measure the im-
pact of multilateral and regional liberalization on trade. Secondly, based on
the two time-series we use a vector auto-regressive (VAR) approach to esti-
mate the e⁄ect of multilateral on regional trade liberalization and vice versa.
Thirdly, we examine their causal interrelation based on impulse-response-
functions and Granger-causality analysis, i. e. we investigate whether and
how regional trade liberalization reacts to multilateral trade liberalization,
and vice versa.
5The Gravity Model
In a ￿rst step, we use a standard gravity model to obtain the time-
speci￿c e⁄ects of both multilateral (represented by GATT/WTO member-
ship) and regional (represented by RTA membership) agreements on inter-
national trade. In particular, we regress bilateral trade ￿ ows on countries￿
membership in GATT/WTO and RTAs together with standard gravity con-
trol variables to estimate the time-speci￿c impact of multilateral and regional
trade liberalization on trade ￿ ows for each year.2 In formal terms, the model
is given by:
Importsijt = ￿ +
2006 X
t=1953




#tDt both partners inside same RTAijt
+￿Xijt + ￿ij + ￿t + "ijt
where i and j denote the importing and exporting country, respectively, and
t depicts time. The vector Xijt represents the standard control variables in
gravity models.3 ￿ is the common intercept, ￿ij and ￿t represent country pair
speci￿c and time dummies, respectively; "ijt is a white noise error term. The
variable both partners inside the GATT/WTO is a binary dummy variable
that is de￿ned as one if both trading partners participate in GATT/WTO
in year t, and zero otherwise. Similarly, both partners inside RTA is a binary
dummy variable that equals to one if both trading partners belong to the
2Regarding the theoretical foundation of the gravity model see among others Anderson
(1979), Bergstrand (1985), Deardor⁄(1998), as well as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
3See appendix for a description of the variables.
6same RTA in year t. The term
P2006
t=1953 ￿tDt both partners inside GATT/-
WTOijt generates 54 separate dummy variables that represent the time-
speci￿c impact of multilateral trade liberalization. As an example, the term
D1970 both partners inside GATT/WTOij1970 generates a separate variable
which is one if both trading partners are GATT/WTO members in 1970, else
zero. Thus, ￿1970 represents the impact of multilateral trade liberalization in
year 1970.4 The same transformation is undertaken for membership in RTAs
using the term
P2006
t=1957 #tDt both partners inside same RTAijt.5 Generally, ￿t
and #t represent the estimated coe¢ cients regarding the time-speci￿c impact
of multilateral (GATT/WTO) and regional (RTA) trade liberalization for
each year in the data set, respectively.
We di⁄erentiate these time-speci￿c e⁄ects of GATT/WTO and RTAs as
these institutions are subject to a continuous change. For instance, GATT/-
WTO currently regulates a much wider range of issues in more depth than
in former times with RTAs having changed in a similar way (WTO, 2007).
The so-called ￿new￿regionalism goes well beyond mere tari⁄ liberalization
and features deeper forms of integration, such as economic reforms as well as
factor market integration among others (Bur￿sher et al., 2003).
We estimate the model using ￿xed e⁄ect Poisson maximum likelihood
4Note that this speci￿cation does not consider the duration of GATT/WTO member-
ship. We have also taken the duration of GATT/WTO membership into account and
found that it does not change the results of the gravity model estimation signi￿cantly.
5Note that the variable both partners inside RTA only accounts for mere member-
ship in regional trade agreements. Additionally, we have also experimented with various
dimensions of regional trade agreements. In particular, we accounted for de facto RTA
membership by using time lags (Tomz et al., 2007). We also accounted for the number
of di⁄erent RTAs one country is engaged in. Furthermore, we considered e⁄ective RTAs
according to Holmes (2005). Again, we ￿nd that the results of our study do not change
signi￿cantly.
7(FE-PML) estimation. Since comprehensive trade data sets are typically
characterized by numerous zero trade ￿ ows, we have to take them into ac-
count to avoid biased estimates.6 As the traditional log-linearization of the
gravity model cannot account for zero trade ￿ ows, we follow Verbeek (2008)7
and apply the Poisson maximum likelihood (PML) estimator.8 The (ex-
pected) trade ￿ ows can then be modeled using an exponential function:
E(yijt j xijt) = exp(x
0
ijt￿); (2)
where yijt represents bilateral trade ￿ ows and xijt denotes a vector of exoge-
nous variables. The non-negativity of the exponential function ensures that
the predicted values for yijt are also non-negative. As this approach does not
require a log-linearization of the variables, the problem of zero trade ￿ ows
can be avoided.
Step Two: The VAR-Model
In a second step, we use a vector auto-regressive (VAR) framework based
on the two time-series derived from the gravity model to estimate the e⁄ect
of GATT/WTO (multilateral) trade liberalization on RTA (regional) trade
liberalization and vice versa.
As discussed above, the e⁄ects of multilateral and regional liberaliza-
6The current dataset comprises about 46% zero values.
7While Verbeek (2008) provides an overview of the Poisson Maximum Likelihood es-
timation, Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and Winkelmann (2008) discuss the econometric
analysis of count data more comprehensively.
8Regarding the application of gravity models, several authors propose the estimation
of the gravity model in its genuine multiplicative, non-linear form using Poisson maximum
likelihood estimation (Henderson and Millimet, 2008, Westerlund and Wilhelmsson, 2009,
Siliverstovs and Schumacher, 2009, as well as Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
8tion on trade may be subject to various interrelations. In particular, we
identify the following factors which might induce a dynamic political link
between multilateral and regional trade liberalization. As potentially nega-
tive e⁄ects, regionalism might dampen nations￿enthusiasm for multilateral
liberalization, divert policy makers￿attention away from multilateral liber-
alization and create tensions between trading blocs. As potentially positive
e⁄ects, regionalism might relax political resentments between trading blocs,
serve as an experimental ground for new or controversial issues and improve
a country￿ s international reputation.9
It is beyond the scope of this paper to solve for a full dynamic and game-
theoretic equilibrium based on these factors. By contrast, we presume two
empirical reaction functions for multilateral and regional liberalization. In
particular, we are interested in the question how multilateral liberalization
responds to a regional trade liberalization stimulus, and vice versa. There-
fore, we construct a VAR model consisting of the auto-regressive processes of
two time series, namely the yearly time-speci￿c impact of both GATT/WTO
￿t and RTAs #t on international trade. The corresponding bivariate model





















































the lag order, ci is a constant, while di;t is a time dummy, and ui;t represents
9For a discussion see e. g. Baldwin (2004), Bhagwati (1992), Panagariya (1999), Sum-
mers (1991), Pomfret (2006) and Bergsten (1997).
9the error term. The time series VAR model is assumed to be covariance
stationary. The error term vector is i.i.d. with mean zero and unknown
non-singular residual covariance matrix E(utu0
t) =
P
u and existing fourth
moments.10 Consequently, we allow for contemporaneous correlation in the
residuals but no auto-correlation.
Evidently, this is an inherently reduced-form approach. As has been dis-
cussed above, we identify several mechanisms that can a⁄ect the interrelation
between regional and multilateral trade liberalization. We cannot determine
the magnitude of each e⁄ect separately, but instead estimate the net e⁄ect of
the combined mechanisms. For instance, if the sum of coe¢ cients ￿12(L)#t
on ￿t is negative, then the negative e⁄ects, such as the diversion of policy
makers￿attention, dominate and RTAs have a negative e⁄ect on multilateral
trade liberalization. If they are positive, then the positive in￿ uences, such as
the generation of reputation, are more important, i. e. RTAs have a positive
e⁄ect on multilateral trade liberalization.
Step Three: Impulse-Response-Functions and Granger-causality
Analysis
In a third step, we analyze the causal interrelation between regional and
multilateral trade liberalization. We investigate the reaction of GATT/-
WTO trade liberalization on RTA liberalization and vice versa using impulse-
response-functions. Impulse-response-functions trace out the expected re-
sponse of yit+s to a unit change in yjt, holding constant all past values of
yt.11 In particular, one can use impulse-response-functions to investigate the
10See L￿tkepohl and Kr￿tzig, 2004, chapter 3.2.
11See L￿tkepohl and Kr￿tzig, 2004, chapter 4.3.
10response of one event to the impact of the other.
Additionally, we test whether trade liberalization on one institutional
level causes trade liberalization on the other institutional level. That is, can
we reasonably say that GATT/WTO liberalizes trade as a reaction to RTA
trade liberalization, and vice versa? Our main empirical tool for doing so
is the Granger-causality test. Following Granger (1969), variable X causes
variable Y if the forecasting of the latter is improved by incorporating in the
analysis information concerning X and its past.
Data
Our gravity model analysis is based on a sample that covers 184 coun-
tries with 240 RTAs over the period from 1953 to 2006 with annual data.12
We de￿ne GATT/WTO membership according to Tomz et al. (2007) and
include RTAs following WTO (2009c) and McGill (2009).
For the VAR analysis, we use the two series obtained from the gravity
model estimation. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) suggests the en-
dogenous lag order 3 for the bivariate model. In order to save degrees of
freedom, we take advantage of sequential elimination algorithms which pre-
select the speci￿c lagged variables that are to be estimated in the model
(L￿tkepohl and Kr￿tzig, 2004, and Br￿ggemann and L￿tkepohl, 2001). The
speci￿ed VAR model is estimated by OLS.
12Data sources are reported in the appendix.
113 Empirical Results
Gravity Equation
[Table 1: Gravity model estimation.]
The gravity equation is estimated with FE-PML with the results being re-
ported in table 1.13 Regarding the control variables, the coe¢ cient estimates
meet the expectations and are in line with the standard gravity literature.
In particular, the imports of RTA members from non-members (Importer in
RTA) are stimulated by about 7% (exp(0.07)-1) while the exports of RTA
members to non-participants (Exporter in RTA) are around -3% lower due
to trade diversion. It should be noted that the results average out the e⁄ects
of the 240 RTAs covered by the data set, where the impact of the di⁄erent
RTAs is likely to vary. GATT/WTO membership of only one trading partner
has a signi￿cantly positive impact on bilateral trade. This result has been
interpreted as a public goods or selection e⁄ect of GATT/WTO membership
(Subramanian and Wei, 2007, p. 165). The Generalized System of Prefer-
ences negatively a⁄ects both the exports of GSP recipients (GSP-recipient-
exports) as well as the exports of granting countries (GSP-donor-exports).
This result seems to be counter-intuitive since GSP programs are intended to
foster developing countries￿exports (UNCTAD, 2008). However, the litera-
ture discusses several problems inherent to GSP schemes which might lead to
distortions in the economic structure and trading patterns of GSP recipients
(e. g., Hoekman and ￿zden, 2005, Dowlah, 2008).
13Note that the results from the FE-PML estimation are robust to FE-PML with only
non-zero observations. The results di⁄er from the traditional FE-OLS estimation due to
econometric reasons discussed above.
12The results for the remaining time-variant control variables are gener-
ally in line with expectations. The economic size of the trading partners
substantially contributes to bilateral trade. Capital-intensive production,
depicted by GDP per capita, stimulates trade. A high capital-labor ratio
indicates a more di⁄erentiated economic structure which should contribute
to better trading opportunities. A devaluation of the importing country￿ s
real exchange rate has a negative impact on imports, while current colonial
relationships foster contemporaneous trade by about 40%. More democratic
nations seem to trade signi￿cantly more than autocratic nations as both
polity variables indicate ￿a result which is consistent with the ￿ndings of
Decker and Lim (2008) and Eichengreen and Leblang (2007).
[Figure 1: Yearly time-speci￿c impact of GATT/WTO and RTAs on
trade.]
The yearly time-speci￿c e⁄ects of both GATT/WTO and RTAs are dis-
played in ￿gure 1 together with the 95% con￿dence intervals. The yearly
time-speci￿c impact of GATT/WTO (solid line) ￿ uctuates around the av-
erage of 0.78 which indicates that trade among GATT/WTO members is
about twice as large (118%) as trade between non-members. In contrast, the
time-speci￿c point estimates of RTAs (dashed line) follow a concave func-
tion with signi￿cantly negative values for the 1950s and signi￿cantly positive
values since the beginning of the 1960s. The early negative e⁄ects might be
explained by the fact that with the exception of the European Common Mar-
ket most RTAs were ine⁄ectively implemented and eventually failed during
that period (Pomfret, 2007, and Panagariya, 1999). In addition, these ￿rst
13attempts of the so-called ￿rst wave of regionalism during the 1950s/1960s
were characterized by ￿shallow￿integration which did not get beyond mere
tari⁄ liberalization and rarely took place between developed and less devel-
oped countries but rather among countries with similar income levels (Li-
mao, 2007, WTO, 2009c, and McGill, 2009). Generally, the e⁄ects of RTAs
on international trade were limited. With the ongoing process of regional
liberalization and the wider scope of RTA liberalization, the e⁄ect of RTAs
on members￿trade increased signi￿cantly.
The time-speci￿c impact of GATT/WTO is more volatile and has two
periods with particularly strong e⁄ects, namely 1960-1973 and 1985-1992.
By contrast, the point estimates of RTAs develop in a relatively steady way,
except for the period 1985-1992, when the RTA-e⁄ect increased somewhat
more strongly. This coincides with the so-called second wave of regionalism
which was initiated at the beginning of the 1980s when the United States
turned away from the multilateral approach and promoted the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The second wave was also stimulated
by the completion of the European Community￿ s (EC) internal market in
1992 (Pomfret, 2007, and Panagariya, 1999). The third wave of regionalism
started at the beginning of the 2000s and does not seem to have any major
e⁄ects neither on the impact of RTAs on international trade nor on the e⁄ect
of GATT/WTO.
VAR Estimation
We use the two time series obtained from the gravity analysis to estimate
the e⁄ect of multilateral on regional trade liberalization and vice versa. In
14particular, we set up a bivariate VAR model regressing the two variables
on their past values. Due to the limited number of observations, we employ
sequential elimination algorithms which preselect the speci￿c lagged variables
that are to be estimated in the model (L￿tkepohl and Kr￿tzig, 2004, and
Br￿ggemann and L￿tkepohl, 2001).14
[Table 2: VAR estimation, core model.]
The results of the VAR model estimated with three lags are shown in
table 2. The left-hand panel shows the trade e⁄ect of multilateral trade lib-
eralization (GATT/WTO-e⁄ect) as dependent variable, with lagged values
of multilateral and regional trade liberalization as the explanatory variables.
The right-hand panel displays the trade impact of regional trade liberaliza-
tion as the dependent variable, with lagged values of any multilateral and
regional trade liberalization as the explanatory variables. The results of the
system equation regression indicate that both the net e⁄ect of previous mul-
tilateral liberalization as well as the net e⁄ect of regional liberalization on
contemporaneous multilateral liberalization are signi￿cantly positive. Simi-
larly, the net e⁄ects of multilateral and regional liberalization on subsequent
regional liberalization are signi￿cantly positive.
Impulse-Response-Functions and Granger-causality analysis
We investigate the dynamic interrelations between multilateral and re-
gional liberalization by using forecast error impulse-response-functions (IRF).
14According to standard residual tests, such as the Portmanteau test and the Breusch-
Godfrey LM test, residual auto-correlation is not indicated. The Lomnicki-Jarque-Bera
tests suggest that both u1 and u2 are consistent with a standard normal distribution.
Additionally, the ARCH-LM tests assure heteroskedasticity-consistent estimation.
15The left panel of ￿gure 2 illustrates how the expected e⁄ect of multilateral
trade liberalization under GATT/WTO reacts to a unit change of the trade
e⁄ect of regional liberalization while the right panel shows the response of
regional liberalization to a unit change in multilateral liberalization.15
[Figure 2: Impulse-response-functions.]
The results indicate that multilateral trade liberalization reacts in a sta-
tistically signi￿cant way in the ￿rst and second (and third according to Hall￿ s
percentile) year after regional trade liberalization has taken place (left-hand
panel). Technically speaking, if RTAs liberalize trade so that the trade vol-
ume increases by one unit, the expected response of GATT/WTO is multi-
lateral trade liberalization associated with a trade increase by 1.6 units. In-
tuitively, an RTA-induced increase in trade is followed by multilateral trade
liberalization in the subsequent years, whereby this GATT/WTO driven lib-
eralization response is even stronger in the ￿rst subsequent year than the
regional liberalization stimulus. This ￿nding might not only support the
hypothesis of double trade activism, where countries use regional as well as
multilateral institutions as complements to liberalize trade (Trejos, 2005),
but also indicates that RTA liberalization might be a promotive impulse so
that even stronger multilateral trade liberalization is possible.
[Table 3: Granger-causality tests.]
The Granger-causality test indicates that RTA liberalization Granger-
causes multilateral trade liberalization under GATT/WTO (table 3). The
15The plots also contain the 90% Efron and Hall percentiles con￿dence intervals which
are bootstrapped with 2000 replications (B=2000) over 10 periods (h=10).
16lack of any negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients in the impulse-
response-function suggests that regional trade liberalization does not have a
net negative e⁄ect on multilateral trade liberalization. This ￿nding supports
the Summers (1991)-hypothesis which emphasizes the positive impact of re-
gional arrangements on the MTS. According to Bergsten (1997), RTAs are
able to detent political tensions between nations, e. g. in Europe after WW
II, which can also alleviate multilateral negotiations. Additionally, RTAs can
stimulate both internal and international negotiation dynamics. Since RTAs
provide for more ￿ exible and e¢ cient negotiations than multilateral agree-
ments, RTAs can serve as testing ￿elds for new liberalization ideas which
can subsequently be negotiated in the multilateral setting, e. g. services or
intellectual property rights (WTO, 2009c, Trejos, 2005, Pomfret, 2006, and
Bergsten, 1997). Moreover, members of RTAs can gain stability and reputa-
tion through their commitment to regional arrangements which is likely to
have positive e⁄ects for negotiations on the multilateral level, like in the case
of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (Paiva and Gazel, 2003).
When analyzing possible e⁄ects of multilateral on regional trade liberal-
ization, the right-hand panel of ￿gure 2 to some degree suggests that regional
trade liberalization might respond in a positive way to multilateral trade lib-
eralization. However, evidence on the causality tests (table 3) indicate that
GATT/WTO liberalization does not Granger-cause RTA liberalization, over-
all.
Taken together, the Granger-causality analyses indicate an unidirectional
causality relation from GATT/WTO to RTAs. An increase in RTA trade
liberalization stimulates multilateral trade liberalization by GATT/WTO,
17however not vice versa. We can respond to the question of Bhagwati and
Panagariya (1996) that the relationship between the multilateral system and
regionalism is characterized by an asymmetric friendship.
Are the Results Robust to Models Controlling for Global Develop-
ments?
Generally, causality in a bivariate analysis could be due to omitted vari-
ables. To avoid incorrect inferences, we integrate several additional variables
in our vector auto-regressive (VAR) system and test the causality relations
again. In particular, we complement the VAR model with several variables
controlling for the number of GATT/WTO members and the number of
RTAs (model 2), and indicators of general globalization developments, such
as world GDP (model 3) or the KOF globalization-index (model 4). Since the
KOF globalization-index is only available for the years since 1970 and thus
restricts the analysis to the period 1970-2006, we include all control variables
except the globalization-index in model 5, while we incorporate all control
variables together with the globalization-index in model 6. The results of the
IRFs are shown in ￿gure 3 while the corresponding Granger-causality tests
are reported in table 4.16
[Figure 3: Impulse-response-funcions, models 2-6.]
[Table 4: Granger-causality tests for models 2-6.]
Generally, the impulse-response-fuctions support the ￿ndings obtained
from the core section. If RTAs liberalize trade, the expected response of
16The corresponding estimation results are reported in table 5 in the appendix.
18GATT/WTO is multilateral trade liberalization (left-hand panel, ￿gure 3).
According to the causality tests, we ￿nd evidence that regional trade liber-
alization signi￿cantly Granger-causes multilateral trade liberalization (table
4). However, two results are of particular interest. Regarding model 2,
we ￿nd a signi￿cantly positive response of GATT/WTO liberalization ini-
tially, while it becomes signi￿cantly negative in periods 3-4 (￿gure 3). This
might indicate that initially the positive implications of RTA liberalization
outweigh the negative transmission mechanisms so that the net e⁄ect is pos-
itive, while the net e⁄ect becomes negative in later periods possibly because
the e⁄orts associated with double trade activism are hard to maintain over
a longer time period. With respect to model 6, the reactions seem to emerge
in cycles, i. e. in period 1, 4 and 8. This sawtooth pattern might indicate
a liberalization process which alternates between regional and multilateral
trade liberalization.
The impulse-response-functions on the right hand-side indicate a posi-
tive response of RTA liberalization on multilateral liberalization (￿gure 3).
In contrast to the core analysis above, we ￿nd support for the hypothesis
that GATT/WTO liberalization Granger-causes regional trade liberalization
(table 4), although the response of GATT/WTO liberalization to RTA lib-
eralization is much stronger than vice versa. Three ￿ndings might be of
interest. The IRF of model 2 indicates that the reaction of regional liberal-
ization on multilateral liberalization is positive in the ￿rst subsequent year,
and additionally in periods 3-5 with a break in period 2. Regarding model
3, regional liberalization seems to respond to a certain degree to multilateral
liberalization (￿gure 3), while we ￿nd no evidence of Granger-causality (table
194). Referring to model 6, we ￿nd an alternating response of regional trade
liberalization on GATT/WTO liberalization ￿similar to the pattern in the
opposite direction.
Summarizing, we ￿nd ￿based on Granger-causality tests ￿a so-called
feedback relationship between multilateral and regional trade liberalization,
overall. The results indicate that multilateral trade liberalization responds in
a signi￿cantly positive way during the ￿rst years after regional liberalization
has taken place. Likewise, RTA liberalization reactions are signi￿cantly pos-
itive during the ￿rst periods after multilateral liberalization has taken place.
However, only in model 2 we ￿nd a signi￿cantly negative response of GATT/-
WTO to RTA liberalization in a later period, while GATT/WTO liberaliza-
tion reacts positive on RTA liberalization also in later periods. Additionally,
multilateral liberalization seems not to Granger-cause RTA liberalization in
model 3.
4 Conclusion
Since the ￿rst wave of regionalism until the 1980s, discussion on regionalism
was characterized by static trade creation and trade diversion e⁄ects of RTAs.
With the second wave of regionalism during the 1990s, the debate on region-
alism turned to the dynamic interrelation between regional integration and
multilateral trade liberalization. In this context, Bhagwati and Panagariya
(1996) ask whether RTAs and the MTS are ￿strangers, friends, or foes￿ ? We
￿nd robust evidence that multilateral trade liberalization responds in a signif-
icantly positive way during the ￿rst years after regional trade liberalization.
20Additionally, we ￿nd robust evidence that RTA liberalization signi￿cantly
Granger-causes GATT/WTO liberalization. A sensitivity analysis indicates
that these results are robust to changes in control variables. In contrast, our
results do not robustly indicate that regional trade liberalization responds
in a signi￿cantly positive way to multilateral trade liberalization. Thus, our
results suggest an unidirectional relationship between multilateralism and re-
gionalism. Using the terms of Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), we might
call this relation an asymmetric friendship. At least, we can ensure that
regional trade liberalization does not react in a signi￿cantly negative way to
multilateral trade liberalization.
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28Description of variables
The control variables of the gravity model Xijt are de￿ned as follows: Im-
porter in GATT/WTO (exporter in GATT/WTO) equals to one if only the
importing (exporting) country is a GATT/WTO member. GSP-recipient-
exports (GSP-donor-exports) accounts for a bilateral relationship under the
Generalized System of Preferences and is de￿ned as one if the exporting (im-
porting) country is granted the GSP scheme from the importing (exporting)
country. Importer in RTA (exporter in RTA) is one for a pair of trading
countries if only the importing (exporting) country participates in a regional
trade agreement. Log real GDP represents the economic size of the trading
partners measured as GDP in real terms. Log real GDPPC denotes real
GDP per capita which can be interpreted as the capital-labour ratio. Log
RER depicts the logarithm of the bilateral real exchange rate de￿ned in price
notation. Currently colonized is de￿ned as one if a country is currently col-
onized by its trading partner. Polity is a measure for the polity regime and
is scaled from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Note
that we do not include any time-invariant variables as these drop out due to
the ￿xed e⁄ects estimation which has emerged as the preferred model.
29Variable Source
Bilateral exports IMF (2007a, 2007b)
Nominal GDP (PPP) IMF (2008), Worldbank (2007), Heston et
al. (2006)
Consumer price index IMF (2008), Worldbank (2007)
(CPI, 2000=100)
Population Maddison (2008), IMF (2008), Heston et
al. (2006)
GATT/WTO-accession WTO (2009a, 2009b),
Tomz et al. (2007)
GSP programs UNCTAD (1973-1986, 2001, 2005)
Regional trade agreements WTO (2009c), McGill (2009)
Colonial relationships, CIA (2007)
common country
Nominal exchange rate IMF (2008)
Geographic distance, area, borders CEPII (2008)
common language,
landlocked, island
KOF Globalization-Index KOF (2009)
Polity Marshall and Jaggers (2009)
30Data- Deterministic No. of ADF
transformation term Lags test-statistic 10% 5% 1%
GATT/WTO-effect level constant L 0 -2.57* -2.57 -2.86 -3.43
level constant L 1 -2.83*
level constant L 2 -2.65*
level constant L 3 -2.73*
RTA-effect level constant, time trend L 0 -3.41** -3.13 -3.41 -3.96
level constant, time trend L 1 -3.42**
level constant, time trend L 2 -3.66**
level constant, time trend L 3 -3.22*
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
Critical values
Null-hypothesis Test statistics P-value
Portmanteau-test no residual autocorrelation 8.07 0.78
LM-test for autocorrelation
   in AR models
no residual autocorrelation 17.84 0.60
Lomnicki-Jarque-Bera-test
   for nonnormality
residuals are consistent with
a standard normal distribution
   u1 0.89 0.64
   u2 0.94 0.62
Multivariate ARCH-LM-test no conditional heteroskedasticity 40.60 0.66
Univariate ARCH-LM-test no conditional heteroskedasticity
   u1 0.72 0.98
   u2 1.24 0.94
Figure 1: Yearly time-speci￿c impact of GATT/WTO and RTAs on trade.
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   Wald-test-statistic
1 5.31*** 1.77 5.78*** 3.01** 3.54**
   P-value 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.02
   ηG ATT/WTO?RTAs + (+) + + +
RTA => GATT/WTO
   Wald-test-statistic
2 6.54*** 7.42*** 7.55*** 5.20*** 9.09***
   P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   ηRTAs?G ATT/WTO - + + + +
1 Wald-test that GATT/WTO does not Granger-cause RTAs.
2 Wald-test that RTAs do not Granger-cause GATT/WTO.
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
3 Added variables: Number of GATT/WTO members, number of RTAs.
4 Added variables: Real world GDP.
5 Added variables: KOF globalization index
6 Added variables: No. of GATT/WTO members, no. of RTAs, real world GDP.
7 Added variables: No. of GATT/WTO members, no. of RTAs, real world GDP, globalization index.
Figure 2: Impulse-response-functions.
31Figure 3: Impulse-response-funcions, models 2-6.
32Dependent Variable:
Real importsij Coef. S. E. Coef. S. E.
Importer in GATT/WTO 0.42*** 0.02 …  continued …
Ex porter in GATT/W TO 0.41*** 0.02 Both in GATT/WTO 1998 0.89*** 0.02
GSP-recipient-exports -0.12*** 0.01 Both in GATT/WTO 1999 0.89*** 0.02
GSP-donor-exports -0.04*** 0.01 Both in GATT/WTO 2000 0.79*** 0.02
Importer in RTA 0.07*** 0.00 Both in GATT/WTO 2001 0.94*** 0.02
Exporter in RTA -0.03*** 0.00 Both in GATT/WTO 2002 0.90*** 0.02
Log real GDPi 0.59*** 0.01 Both in GATT/WTO 2003 0.83*** 0.02
Log real GDPj 0.74*** 0.01 Both in GATT/WTO 2004 0.79*** 0.02
Log real GDPPC i 0.22*** 0.01 Both in GATT/WTO 2005 0.66*** 0.03
Log real GDPPC j 0.41*** 0.01 Both in GATT/WTO 2006 0.59*** 0.10
Log RERij -0.09*** 0.01 Both in RTA 1957 -0.28*** 0.05
Currently colonized 0.34*** 0.13 Both in RTA 1958 -0.21*** 0.05
Polityi 0.01*** 0.01 Both in RTA 1959 -0.11** 0.04
Polityj 0.01*** 0.01 Both in RTA 1960 -0.13*** 0.03
Both in GATT/WTO 1953 0.41*** 0.05 Both in RTA 1961 -0.10*** 0.03
Both in GATT/WTO 1954 0.43*** 0.05 Both in RTA 1962 -0.08*** 0.03
Both in GATT/WTO 1955 0.46*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1963 0.00 0.02
Both in GATT/WTO 1956 0.44*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1964 0.01 0.02
Both in GATT/WTO 1957 0.42*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1965 0.01 0.02
Both in GATT/WTO 1958 0.36*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1966 0.01 0.02
Both in GATT/WTO 1959 0.43*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1967 0.02 0.02
Both in GATT/WTO 1960 0.87*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1968 0.03 0.02
Both in GATT/WTO 1961 0.79*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1969 0.11*** 0.02
Both in GATT/WTO 1962 0.80*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1970 0.05*** 0.02
Both in GATT/WTO 1963 0.81*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1971 0.08*** 0.02
Both in GATT/WTO 1964 0.78*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1972 0.11*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1965 0.88*** 0.04 Both in RTA 1973 0.11*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1966 0.87*** 0.03 Both in RTA 1974 0.06*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1967 0.87*** 0.03 Both in RTA 1975 0.07*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1968 0.86*** 0.03 Both in RTA 1976 0.10*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1969 0.86*** 0.03 Both in RTA 1977 0.09*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1970 1.00*** 0.03 Both in RTA 1978 0.15*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1971 0.99*** 0.03 Both in RTA 1979 0.17*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1972 1.00*** 0.03 Both in RTA 1980 0.15*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1973 0.91*** 0.03 Both in RTA 1981 0.09*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1974 0.78*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1982 0.15*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1975 0.67*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1983 0.19*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1976 0.66*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1984 0.13*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1977 0.69*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1985 0.19*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1978 0.72*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1986 0.22*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1979 0.73*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1987 0.29*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1980 0.64*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1988 0.27*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1981 0.57*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1989 0.38*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1982 0.57*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1990 0.37*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1983 0.64*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1991 0.39*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1984 0.77*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1992 0.36*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1985 0.81*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1993 0.31*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1986 0.96*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1994 0.35*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1987 0.99*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1995 0.36*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1988 1.00*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1996 0.35*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1989 0.88*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1997 0.32*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1990 1.02*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1998 0.32*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1991 1.02*** 0.02 Both in RTA 1999 0.34*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1992 0.99*** 0.02 Both in RTA 2000 0.34*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1993 0.75*** 0.02 Both in RTA 2001 0.29*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1994 0.75*** 0.02 Both in RTA 2002 0.29*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1995 0.76*** 0.02 Both in RTA 2003 0.27*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1996 0.78*** 0.02 Both in RTA 2004 0.32*** 0.01
Both in GATT/WTO 1997 0.81*** 0.02 Both in RTA 2005 0.31*** 0.01
…  to be continued … Both in RTA 2006 0.40*** 0.01
No. of observations 526874
No. of country-pairs 17332
Wald-statistic 550196.08
Log likelihood -303290.15
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
All estimations enclose year and country-pair dummies. Constants are not reported.
FE-PML




















*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
Sample range [1957, 2006]. SD in parentheses.
Model 1
Causality direction Model 1
GATT/WTO => RTA
   Wald-test-statistic
1 1.32
   P-value 0.27
   ηGATT/WTO?RTAs (+)
RTA => GATT/WTO
   Wald-test-statistic
2 5.65***
   P-value 0.01
   ηRT As?GATT/WTO +
1 Wald-test that GATT/WTO does not Granger-cause RTAs.
2 Wald-test that RTAs do not Granger-cause GATT/WTO.
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
Table 2: VAR estimation, core model.
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
GATT/WTO => RTA
   Wald-test-statistic
1 0.61 1.23 0.97 0.60
   P-value 0.54 0.30 0.43 0.72
   ηGATT/WTO?RT As
RTA => GATT/WTO
   Wald-test-statistic2 10.06*** 5.10*** 2.66** 2.20**
   P-value 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05
   ηRTAs?GATT/WTO
1 Wald-test that GATT/WTO does not Granger-cause RTAs.
2 Wald-test that RTAs do not Granger-cause GATT/WTO.
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
Wald-test-statistic P-value Wald-test-statistic P-value
Model 1 5.65*** 0.01 1.32 0.27
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
GATT/WTO => RTA RTA => GATT/WTO
Wald-test-statistic P-value Wald-test-statistic P-value
Model 2 6.54*** 0.00 5.31*** 0.00
Model 3 7.42*** 0.00 1.77 0.16
Model 4 7.55*** 0.00 5.78*** 0.00
Model 5 5.20*** 0.00 3.01** 0.04
Model 6 9.09*** 0.00 3.54** 0.02
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
GATT/WTO => RTA RTA => GATT/WTO
Wald-test-statistic P-value Wald-test-statistic P-value
Model 7 10.06*** 0.00 0.61 0.54
Model 8 5.10*** 0.00 1.23 0.30
Model 9 2.66** 0.03 0.97 0.43
Model 10 2.20** 0.05 0.60 0.72
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
GATT/WTO => RTA RTA => GATT/WTO
Table 3: Granger-causality tests.
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
GATT/WTO => RTA
   Wald-test-statistic
1 0.61 1.23 0.97 0.60
   P-value 0.54 0.30 0.43 0.72
   ηGATT/WTO?RT As
RTA => GATT/WTO
   Wald-test-statistic2 10.06*** 5.10*** 2.66** 2.20**
   P-value 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05
   ηRTAs?GATT/WTO
1 Wald-test that GATT/WTO does not Granger-cause RTAs.
2 Wald-test that RTAs do not Granger-cause GATT/WTO.
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
Wald-test-statistic P-value Wald-test-statistic P-value
Model 1 5.65*** 0.01 1.32 0.27
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
GATT/WTO => RTA RTA => GATT/WTO
Wald-test-statistic P-value Wald-test-statistic P-value
Model 2 6.54*** 0.00 5.31*** 0.00
Model 3 7.42*** 0.00 1.77 0.16
Model 4 7.55*** 0.00 5.78*** 0.00
Model 5 5.20*** 0.00 3.01** 0.04
Model 6 9.09*** 0.00 3.54** 0.02
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
GATT/WTO => RTA RTA => GATT/WTO
Wald-test-statistic P-value Wald-test-statistic P-value
Model 7 10.06*** 0.00 0.61 0.54
Model 8 5.10*** 0.00 1.23 0.30
Model 9 2.66** 0.03 0.97 0.43
Model 10 2.20** 0.05 0.60 0.72
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
GATT/WTO => RTA RTA => GATT/WTO






















GATT/WTO-effectt-1 0.747*** 0.072* 0.774*** 0.110** 0.764*** 0.153*** 0.583*** 0.105*** 0.422** 0.112***
(0.114) (0.039) (0.126) (0.051) (0.137) (0.041) (0.116) (0.039) (0.121) (0.037)
GATT/WTO-effectt-2 -0.248**  -0.105* -0.253** -0.095 -0.326*** -0.291** -0.131*** -0.485*** -0.122**
(0.112) (0.056) (0.117) (0.061) (0.127) (0.126) (0.049) (0.126) (0.056)
GATT/WTO-effectt-3 0.135*** 0.076* 0.050 0.270** 0.103** 0.264*** 0.062
(0.045) (0.047) (0.034) (0.119) (0.044) (0.107) (0.042)
RTA-effectt-1 0.904*** 0.491*** 1.639*** 0.600*** 1.554*** 0.316** 1.203*** 0.309*** 1.019***
(0.362) (0.103) (0.352) (0.116) (0.336) (0.141) (0.327) (0.127) (0.294)
RTA-effectt-2 -1.287*** -1.066*** -0.562 -0.381*** -0.966*** -0.620*
(0.324) (0.355) ( 404) (0.151) (0.318) (0.359)
RTA-effectt-3 0.135*** 0.949*** 0.410***
(0.045) (0.376) (0.163)





GATT/WTO-membershipt-3 0.616*** 1.081*** 2.455*** 0.685***
(0.180) (0.229) (0.432) (0.177)
RTA-membershipt -0.358*** -0.097*** -0.482*** -0.193*** -0.540*** -0.189***




RTA-membershipt-3 -0.237*** -0.101*** -0.241***
(0.066) (0.035) (0.061)
Real world GDP t -0.381 1.055*** 2.558***
(0.272) (0.386) (0.413)
Real world GDP t-1 -0.175 -0.445 3.826***
(0.448) (0.371) (1.166)
Real world GDP t-2 0.254 -1.562*** -4.651*** -1.497***
(0.429) (0.342) (1.042) (0.398)










Constant -2.570*** 1.240*** -0.244 0.947* 4.880*** 1.600** -1.738*** -6.207***
(0.8.63) (0.598) (0.225) (0.542) (0.894) (0.703) (0.440) (2.264)
Trend 0.031*** 0.013*** 0.008 0.001 0.029*** 0.073*** 0.061*** -0.041***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016)
Sample range [1957, 2006]. SD in parenthesis.
*** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 6 Model 5
Table 5: VAR estimations according to variable variation.
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